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1. Introduction 
The spirit of property doubles a man’s strength. 
- Voltaire 
 
The current British exit from the European Union is the most significant economic divergence 
between the leading countries since the Second World War and much about the forthcoming 
process of transitioning out of the EU has no precedent. Though it is certain already, both the 
UK and the EU will be changed significantly by what is about to unfold. The European Union 
– oftentimes referred to as the EU - is a political and economic cooperation between 28 
European countries. It began after World War Two to promote economic co-operation, with the 
idea countries have trade agreements and a single market are less likely to go to war with each 
other. 
 
Picture 1 - Kallaugher, K., 2016. Europe’s stormy seas, The Economist. 
 
This Bachelor’s dissertation identifies the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union 
(Brexit’s) implications on homeownership, letting market, and the real estate sales market in 
the UK. The current history witnesses one of the most meaningful votes for the British and for 
the Europeans in the 60-year history of the EU. The repercussions are expected to be vast and 
major and would influence nearly all spheres of life in Europe, as well as overseas. The key 
focus of the current thesis is to examine factors are expected to prompt an economic or social 
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change in the real estate in the aftermath of the Article 50 initiated on March 29, 2017 by 
Theresa May. Article 50 is a plan for any country wishes to exit the EU. It was created as part 
of the Treaty of Lisbon - an agreement signed up to by all EU states which became law in 2009. 
Before treaty, there was no formal mechanism for a country to leave the EU. 
 
 
Picture 2 - RICS, 2017. Biggest Risks of Brexit for business. 
 
Since the Article 50 revoked, the succession of the socio-economic changes has gained a 
considerable momentum and entails changes are already happening, contemplating the bigger 
ones, are yet to come. It is of academic and professional interest to trace, identify, research and 
categorize economic fundamentals, such as change in immigration or regulation, the housing 
prices are driven by. And, while the majority of people, interested in the subject, understand 
the most important stipulation of an Article 50: “Any Member State may decide to withdraw 
from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”, it is yet unclear what 
does leaving the European Union really mean for the current homeowners and those trying to 
“get on the ladder”?  
 
This thesis aims to analyse the changes of the real estate market in the United Kingdom and 
identify the factors producing a price change. The dissertation investigates the possible change 
in value of housing caused by Brexit, which is a specific group of investment assets and a major 
component of household wealth for the UK. Understanding the nature and degree of change of 
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housing prices will make market participants aware of the size of their risk exposure and can 
help them to detect early signals of the possibility of investment opportunities or threats. Policy-
makers can use the current dissertation’s information as an information sheet about the 
underlying valuation drivers of the house prices to stabilize the market. This thesis proposes a 
comprehensive analysis of the possible influences. This dissertation also contributes to 
literature and wider academic community both methodologically and empirically.  
 
 
Picture 3 - Kallaugher, K., 2017. Article 50 and Brexit, The Economist. 
 
1.1 Research Problem 
 
The Economist describes Brexit vore as: ”On February 20th David Cameron, Britain's prime 
minister, set June 23rd as the date for a referendum on the country’s membership of the 
European Union”. His announcement followed a protracted renegotiation of the current 
conditions of Britain’s membership at a summit in Brussels. A particular interest in the 
development of the housing prices grew in the aftershock of the referendum vote on 23 June 
2016 in the UK, where the majority at the percentage of 51.89% of the British citizens voted to 
leave the European Union and the following recession spread around the country as a 
consequence. For many it seems difficult to understand how the future would unfold and what 
changes in mortgages, housing prices, rents and stamp duty can be expected. People and 
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economic researchers alike therefore became more aware of the seemingly more intertwined 
financial system and – this part being the focus of this thesis – housing prices.  
 
 
Picture 4 - RICS, 2017. The Built Environment in Figures: Global. 
 
It is important to stress out not only a personal interest in housing and in particular in the British 
housing market, but also the scientific need in this topic to be researched lies behind the current 
research. Attached to the housing market in the United Kingdom is around £11 billion in 
mortgage debt, from which £1 billion belong to lenders from abroad, altogether incorporating 
one of the most extensive concentrations of financial risks (The Economist, 2016). The total 
value of Britain’s housing stock has passed the £6 trillion mark for the first time after gains of 
£385 billion in 2015, but post-credit crunch gains continue to favour the south over the north, 
and unmortgaged home owners and private landlords over homeowners with debt, according to 
new analysis from real estate adviser, Savills. The relevance of housing in the context of 
economics is high. The importance of the reals estate market in the UK’S economy is 
unparalleled. The £6 trillion of housing stock in the United Kingdom form maybe the biggest 
asset class in the world. The statistics (Savills, 2017) show how great the importance of housing 
is in the context of the British economy. Total Value of UK Housing Stock exceeds £6tn for 
the first time (£6.17tn), +£385bn in 2015 and +£1,156bn in 3 years. Housing wealth stands at 
£4.84tn, net of mortgage debt, or 2.7 times GDP. Owner occupiers with no mortgage: total 
property wealth exceeded £2tn for the first time (£2.097tn). Private rented sector: total value 
now £1.29tn, up 55% in 5 years (with number of homes in the sector +28%); net wealth passed 
£1tn in 2015, overtaking held by mortgaged owner occupiers for the first time (£1.077tn vs 
£1.067tn). Total value of homes in London exceeds £1.5tn for the first time (£1.612tn), 
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accounting for more than a quarter of the total value of housing stock in the UK and having 
risen by £589bn in 5 years. South of England: total value growth (+£179bn) exceeded London 
growth (+£126bn) for the first time in 5 years. Bristol shows the biggest increase in total 
housing stock value (+£4.5bn to £44bn) outside London.  
 
The market value of the UK real estate is £1,662bn. The UK has 260,000 professionals shaping 
the built environment. Real estate contributes £94bn to the UK economy, representing a major 
share of 5.4% of the Britain’s GDP. Commercial property directly employs 2.1 million people 
representing 6.8% of labour force. In 2015 Gross Value Added (GPA) from England’s 
predominantly rural areas contributed 16.5% to England’s GPA. Therefore, it is not surprising, 
various institutions, be it governmental, academic or private, strive to find appropriate risk 
metrics or, when analysing price levels, downfall indicators to navigate through the maze of 
post-Brexit legislation. However, the debate about housing crisis is far from being settled and 
research about appropriate measures is ongoing and conflicting. This work will shed light on 
some of the most recent econometric techniques that pioneer in the field, so called fundamental 
based approaches. Measures used in this thesis takes in to account housing only, not other types 
of real estate, although the name might suggest other-wise. The observatio examining just one 
or a few market properties can be misleading motivates me to attempt to develop a more holistic 
methodology for housing investigation. 
 
 
Picture 5 - RICS, 2017. The Built Environment in Figures: UK. 
 
Housing is especially relevant, because the asset involved is not only held by private, capital 
strong investors. This would be typical for the commercial real estate sector. In contrast, private 
single household’s account for a major share in the housing domain and connected to this is an 
outstanding sum of mortgage loans – household’s main liabilities. On top of , if the legal 
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environment and bank practices are securitization friendly, loans can be bundled and sold, 
extending the dependencies of the loans – and therefore the risk of default from the owner. 
Isolated defaults and related foreclosures are not necessarily a problem. If, however properties 
are in general overvalued and the mortgage debt is by far bigger than market prices reflect, spill 
over effects are inevitable, as was seen in the US housing bubble before 2008. So it is in the 
interest of both property owners and investors houses are fairly valued and prices reflect the 
current market situation. 
 
 
Picture 6 - RICS, 2017.The Built Environment in Figures: Europe. 
 
For a brief time, a post-vote uncertainty in the housing market is characterized by a long period 
of irrational and unjustified price increases, followed by price correction. Real estate market 
uncertainty can have serious impact on other markets and the economy as a whole. Reasons for 
the price regime shifts in housing markets can be various, but often they are related to 
speculation and high capital gain expectations. With increasing prices, demand, however 
counter intuitively, is increasing as well, because people expect prices to inflate even further 
(Meen 1990, Jowsey 2011). These can then pass on shocks to the real economy, for instance 
when households withdraw equity from their mortgage for an increase in consumption, as 
happened in the early 2000s (Anundsen 2013). According to Black et al. (2006), house busts 
have a much stronger effect on the economy than stock busts. This is why understanding them 
better is also important for policy making. The observation examining just one or a few market 
properties can be misleading motivates me to attempt to develop a more holistic methodology 
for a network investigation. 
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1.2 Objectives and Approach 
 
I would like to cover the economic, financial, and legal fundamentals could generate a change 
in the United Kingdom’s housing market. Some of the main uncertainty-driven mine, as well 
as research think-tanks, questions are as follows. It is to be noted , while all the attempts to fill 
the data, know-how, legislation uncertainty and other research problem gaps were made, some 
of the questions were unable to be answered within the current time frame and the bachelor’s 
dissertation framework. The questions addressed while working on this dissertation are: 
 
1. What is the effect of Brexit on the legal structure of, and the legal risks associated with, 
real estate transactions?  
2. What impact will Brexit have on real estate inward investment volumes?  
3. What are the implications for the financing of the UK commercial real estate?  
4. Will there be significant changes to environmental and health and safety regulation in 
the UK following Brexit?  
5. Will Brexit have an impact on the planning process for development projects?  
 
General reasoning behind this work is a need to assess the research gap in analysing the 
repercussions of Brexit on the UK housing market. This is largely backed up by the fact real 
estate is at the core of the British economy – in fact it “houses the economy” – it is the buildings 
to live, get education, hospital care, work and rest – and the means through which people 
commute, import and export. The review of the recent trends in the housing market, as well as 
the overview of the factors potentially shifting the price or influence the market in any other 
way.  
 
The primary objective of the current thesis is to support filling up the gap of the research strives 
to structure, or at least assess, the ambiguity created by the British exit from the European 
Union. I contend there is a gap in the existing publications for real estate economics. Currently 
there are two types of research in the real estate books on the market: the first is highly academic 
with little practical relevance, and the second is highly practical with little of the academic rigor 
required to fully comprehend the reasoning behind the changes prompted by Brexit. This 
Bachelor’s thesis investigates tests and the existing research materials, as well as the outcomes 
of my own survey and research. The theoretical part primarily overviews publications 
accessible electronically, such as collections of policy documents, standards, archive material, 
videos, and audio-recordings.  
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Picture 7 - Telegraph, 2017. The Boltons in Chelsea: one of the most expensive streets in the 
UK. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The dissertation complies the theoretical and empirical findings on the favoritism of the real 
estate sector of the United Kingdom, imposed by Brexit. The theoretical part of the thesis 
overviews the hypotheses, theories, existing evidence, previous historical examples of the 
countries changing their position within the European Union, as well as the literature foundation 
of the study.  
 
The Chapter 1, Introduction opens the document and sets a purpose for the study; it assesses 
the scope of the research and how the issues are addressed. The first chapter is followed by a 
subheading 1.1 Research Problem that justifies the industrial necessity for a across-the-board 
research and the economic urgency of the issue. The following subtitle 1.2 Objectives and 
Approach sets the aims for a dissertation work and the means by which the findings were 
achieved. The paragraph 1.3 Structure of the Thesis is an outline of the dissertation. The Chapter 
2 Literature Review comprises an exhaustive literature review and outlines hypotheses on the 
post-Brexit housing market taken from the existing literature, articles, speeches, interviews and 
publications on the current state of the housing market in Britain. The research is executed by 
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sector; e.g.: political background, practice background, methodological background, 
geographical background, literary background; it is subdivided by the nine subheadings: 
Regulation, Planning, Infrastructure, Immigration, Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, Housing 
Prices, GDP and Output and Uncertainty. The paragraph 2.1 Regulation synopsizes the biggest 
amount of literature as the Brexit process necessitates an immense amount of institutional 
change is ordered by the number of law-enforced requirement and procedures. The subsection 
2.2 Planning overviews the possible alteration in the planning regulation, with an outline of the 
conceivably positive changes that could happen should Britain be no longer regulated by the 
European Union. The paragraph 2.3 Infrastructure indications the changes within the built 
transport environment, as the United Kingdom is a predominantly public-transport using 
country that creates neither enough space, nor taxation environment for regular car ownership. 
The passage 2.4 Immigration submits the second largest observed amount of literature and legal 
documents, since one of the main doctrines of the initial Brexit vote proposal was to regulate 
the unrestricted migration from the European Union, and the wider European Economic Area, 
as a process highlighted by politicians as potentially harmful for the economy. The paragraph 
2.5 Trade looks into imports’ and exports’ influence on the housing market.. The paragraph 2.6 
Foreign Direct Investment assesses whether Brexit will restrict investment to the United 
Kingdom. The section 2.7 Housing Prices discusses monetary changes in transactions. The 
subheading 2.8 GDP and Output identifies the diversion in spending. The concluding section 
2.9 Uncertainty summarises general impressions and economic shocks that occur in Brexit 
environment in the real estate sector in the United Kingdom.  
 
The empirical part describes the experiment, its theoretical prediction and background, 
methods, materials and comprehensive analysis of the results, as well as analyses finding of the 
empirical research. Chapter 1.2. Objectives And Approach states the primary hypothesis and 
sets the agenda for the research. The second chapter gives an overview of the finding from an 
existing publications: academic literature. It also defines the limitations to the research and 
pitfalls in the current studies. The chapter Literature Review effectively sets-out a checklist of 
the immediate and known issues on which city leaders, businesses and investors should focus 
over the coming few months in order to promote cooperation, dialogue and smoother exit from 
the European Union. This should be the agenda for cities as they shape their response to the 
post-Referendum world. It should be the basis on which cities and their stakeholders negotiate 
with a new Government. And the centrality of these issues makes a powerful case for city 
leaders to be fundamentally involved, alongside the devolved administrations, in the withdrawal 
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negotiations. The Chapter 3, Materials and Methods sets a purpose for the study, and how the 
issue is going to be tackled; it assesses the scope of the research and how the issues are going 
to be addressed, the chapter also discloses how the results are delivered. It consists of the five 
sub-paragraphs. Paragraph 3.1 Methodology is a description of the questionnaire, target 
audience, respondents and time frame. The second paragraph 3.2 Questionnaire’s Composition 
is divided by four parts, each describing the reasoning behind the given question, its format, 
wording, and background. The paragraph 3.3 Data and Experiment gives a proposal overview 
of how the thesis could be used, and by who. The paragraph 3.4 Theoretical Prediction explains 
the background research and market’s estimates on the subject. It shows what results were 
predicted, and which ones have shown unexpected diversion from the theoretical framework. 
The Chapter 4, Results contains two paragraphs: Description and Discussion, and analyses the 
gathered data, as well as explains the possible contradiction from the literature-based theoretical 
predictions of the paragraph 3.4, Theoretical prediction. The chapter 5, conclusion closes the 
research and identifies the answers on questions asked in the chapter 1.2, Objectives and 
approach.  
 
 
Picture 8 – Economist, 2017. Projects, submitted to the EIB (currently pending). 
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The purpose of this dissertation is not to forecast or contemplate on how the unprecedented 
historical events of the last week will play out - this is already available on the front pages of 
every newspaper daily - but to set out the facts as they are known today, and consider the range 
of likely impacts. The possible economic impacts include the loss of significant European 
Union funding streams such as ESIF and EDRF, jobs and investment linked to European trade, 
future investment in infrastructure and business, universities’ ability to continue to attract EU 
academics and students, and research and innovation investment. 
 
 
Picture 9 – Economist, 2016. Distribution of ESIF Funding. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Up until now, a year since the historic referendum vote, there existed no rich data on the 
predicted after-Brexit state of the housing market providing the turnout of Brexit vote was 
largely unexpected. From the very first date when the official campaign period started on April 
15, 2016 and for the clear majority of the campaign ⎯ 10 weeks before polling day ⎯ until 
June 23, 2016 both polls and markets had “remain” with a solid lead. I have analysed 
publications by the leading think-tanks (eg OECD, WTO, UNESCO), real estate institutions 
(eg RICS, Manchester City Council: Great Manchester Brexit Monitor) and political 
newspapers (Financial times, Bloomberg, The Economist, Frankfurter Allgemeine) and can 
conclude real estate market was rarely used directly as a pro- or contra- argument in the 
referendum debates. Instead, it is more a correlation than a causation with the political 
sentiment. Real Estate is always talked about at a dinner table across the UK, getting on a 
housing ladder is a plot of plays staged at the London National theatre and the Barbican, 
chronical shortage of the living space is deeply wined theme of British humor. Reals Estate 
problems are outcomes of socio-political changes that were used in Brexit talks: immigration 
and population control, foreign workers, centralized power and crowding-out, trade and 
investment.  
 
In the current literature review, I will analyse bibliography that assesses the different spheres 
of the real estate market in the United Kingdom. To this date, there exists no book published in 
the years of 2016-2017 that would allow a reader to get a across-the-board overview on possible 
changes in the country’s housing situation. This, therefore, highlights the empirical and 
academic value of my dissertation and allows for comprising an outline for further research. I 
divided possible Brexit repercussions on the real estate onto nine categories, each of which I 
analyse using different literature from economic fields and approaches. I am comparing 
advances academic literature to the prevailing political arguments manipulating Brexit talks to 
distinguish the relevance in theoretical framework. I then add forecasts aiming at drawing a 
broad picture. Below is the table drawn by the Economist that outlines different political 
sentiments that politicians used to shape the voters’ perception on the referendum.  
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Picture 10 - Economist, 2016. Britain Stronger in Europe; Vote Leave. 
 
When the predicted result shifted towards “leave” early in June, bettors moved in the same 
direction, but not enough ⎯ never once did “leave” come close to taking the lead. However, 
with several the pro-remain surveys results, shortly before the vote shifted the polling average 
close to equal, markets took as a clear symptom of an upcoming victory. On the election day, 
markets recorded some 85% probability the United Kingdom would stay within the European 
Union. Such miscalculations are hard to forecast. In order to anticipate outcomes of any given 
vote, sociologists have only one source at their disposal, ⎯ the statistical data, gathered from 
the responses to the poll. 
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Picture 11 - Huffington Post, 2016. Internet Brexit polls. 
 
 “In contrast, bettors in prediction markets have full knowledge of all public polls plus other 
valuable types of information such as fundraising, endorsements, media coverage, insiders 
trading on non-public knowledge and the like.” Admittedly though, unlike polls, prediction 
markets have another tool to measure the respondents degree of certainty in their bet: someone 
who is really sure about an event is likely to wager more on it than someone who is “just taking 
a punt”’ (Who said Brexit was a surprise?, The Economist, Jun 24, 2016). The predicted vote 
was, according to markets, some 38% of the United Kingdom (UK) leaving the European Union 
(EU), against 62% of staying in the EU. The Huffington Post Pollster trend prediction was 
45.6% for leave with 43.1% for remain. 
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Picture 12 - Predictwise, 2016. Brexit poll. 
 
2.1 Regulation 
 
Theresa May has made it clear the UK will not seek to stay in the EU single market (The 
Guardian, March 2, 2018), but the strategy has now been put in doubt by the general election 
result, with some of her MPs - and the strengthened opposition Labour Party ⎯ thought to be 
against it. Labour has said it wants the UK to retain all the benefits of being in the single market, 
even though it does not necessarily have be a member. Staying in the single market means the 
UK staying under the patronages of the European Court of Justice and having to allow unlimited 
EU immigration, under freedom of movement rules. One could find out more detail about Mrs 
May's negotiating priorities in the letter officially starting the process of the leaving the EU on 
29 March. 
 
Mrs May says she wants the UK to reach a new customs union deal with the EU. A customs 
union is where countries agree not to impose tariffs on each other’s' goods and have a common 
tariff on goods coming in from elsewhere. This is important for the real estate market as it 
assures the supply of best material for the construction and building. The UK is currently part 
of the EU customs union but this stops the UK being able to do its own trade deals with other 
countries. The day after initiating Brexit, the government published details of its "Great Repeal 
Bill". Described by Theresa May as an "essential step" on the way to leaving the EU, it aims to 
ensure European law will no longer apply in the UK. It is now being introduced to Parliament, 
with the formal title of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. Here's how it will work: as its 
informal name suggests, the repeal bill will repeal the 1972 European Communities Act, which 
took Britain into the EU and meant European law took precedence over laws passed in the UK 
Parliament. It will also end the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. All existing EU 
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legislation will be copied across into domestic UK law to ensure a smooth transition on the day 
after Brexit. The government says it wants to avoid a "black hole in our statute book" and avoid 
disruption to businesses and individual citizens as the UK leaves the EU (BBC News, EU 
Withdrawal Bill: A guide to the Brexit repeal legislation, 13th November 2017). The UK 
Parliament can then "amend, repeal and improve" the laws as necessary. Ensuring the continuity 
of EU rules and regulations is also meant to aid trade negotiations with the EU because the UK 
will already meet all of its product stands. The repeal bill is likely to be "one of the largest 
legislative projects ever undertaken in the UK", a report by the House of Commons library 
predicts, with "major swathes of the statute book" needing to be examined to see how they will 
work after Brexit. This is because working out which bits of UK law came from the EU is not 
as simple as it may sound. In fact, it presents a "unique challenge", a House of Lords committee 
warned recently, because "the body of EU law is found in a number of different places, and in 
a number of different forms". Simply transposing all EU law into UK legislation will not be 
enough, the government's White Paper on the bill says. Swathes of UK law "will no longer 
work" on exit, for example because they refer to EU institutions. Not all of this can be done 
through the Repeal Bill, so the government plans to create powers to "correct the statute book 
where necessary" ⎯ without full Parliamentary scrutiny. This is the one of the most 
controversial features of the bill (see below). More complications are presented by the 
government's negotiations with the EU, which will be taking place while the bill is passing 
through Parliament. Those talks could shape what the UK's post-Brexit laws look like ⎯ but 
the repeal bill will need to be done and dusted by the day the UK leaves. The bill was included 
in the Queen's Speech in June and will be introduced to Parliament on 13 July. It will then have 
to pass through both Houses of Parliament. The plan is for it to be passed ahead of the UK's 
exit from the EU but to become law only when it actually leaves. Under the formal timetable 
for negotiations, the UK is due to leave the EU in March 2019 unless both sides agree to an 
extension. Until the UK exits formally, EU law will continue to apply. But after leaving, the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Act (as it will be by then) comes into force. The government 
says having the legislation in place will ensure a "calm and orderly exit". Then begins the long-
term process of the government, and Parliament, choosing what it wants to do with the laws it 
has incorporated from the EU. With so many pieces of legislation to be considered, this could 
turn out to be a "major drain on resources" and should not "crowd out" other government 
policies, the Institute for Government think tank has warned. 
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Picture 13 - BBC News, 2017. Steps to UK Leaving the European Union. 
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In 2015 the median house price in England and Wales was roughly nine times median earnings, 
probably the highest level ever (The Economist, 2017, Britain’s housing market is broken —
but not in the ways the government thinks, The Economist, The Economist Group Limited, Feb 
11, 2017). Leaving returns control over legislation and returns sovereignty to UK Parliament; 
burden of regulation would be removed from UK businesses, particularly SMEs.  
 
The Complete Real Estate Encyclopaedia (The Complete Real Estate Encyclopaedia, Denise 
L. Evans, JD O. William Evans, JD, McGraw-Hill, 2007) outlines 20 legal ways to hold real 
estate: 
1. Community property   
2. Condominium   
3. Cooperative apartment   
4. Corporation   
5. General partnership   
6. Interval ownership   
7. Joint tenants with right of survivorship   
8. Joint venture partners   
9. Lease   
10. Leasehold interest   
11. Life estate   
12. Limited liability company   
13. Limited partnership   
14. Ownership in severalty   
15. Remainder interest   
16. Tenants by the entireties   
17. Tenants in common   
18. Tenants in common with cross contingent remainders   
19. TIC properties   
20. Trust  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None of these will be directly affected by Brexit, as the UK’s legal jurisdictions will not be 
affected by the Brexit vote. To be precise, there is a specific set of domestic jurisdictions that 
govern real estate prices in the UK, with no significant intervention at the EU level. Hence, the 
legal formalities required for land ownership, land registration, leases and tenancies, the 
conveyancing process, taking security over land and property taxes such as stamp duty land tax 
and non-domestic rates, are largely unscathed by Brexit. In fact, increasing devolution within 
the UK is likely to have more of an impact in some of these areas than Brexit.  
 
 
Picture 14 - The institutional hierarchy of property markets, Development and Developers: 
perspectives on property, Simon Guy, John Henneberry, 2002 
 
Eamonn D'Arcy and Geoffrey Keogh in the Development and Developers (Development and 
Developers: perspectives on property, Simon Guy, John Henneberry, 2002) indicate the legal 
structure of the institutional hierarchy. It can be seen that country’s internal political institutions 
regulate the market.  
 Page 28 of 85 
 
 
Picture 15 - Governance, Urban Regeneration in the UK, Phil Jones, James Evans, 2008. 
 
However, this is only a part of the story as real estate transactions are not ring-fenced. Many of 
the associated legal risks stem from other areas that are heavily influenced by EU requirements. 
These include planning, public procurement, employment and, perhaps most significant, 
environmental regulation. As an example, obligations imposed on EU member states have led 
to compulsory measures to improve the energy efficiency of buildings and to forthcoming 
restrictions on letting commercial and domestic private property that do not meet a minimum 
energy efficiency standard. Any impact of Brexit on these related areas will potentially have 
repercussions for real estate. 
 
2.2 Planning 
In this section, I analyse what are the relevant land development regulations, such as local 
government zoning, rezoning, subdivision, building construction, or sign regulations or any 
other regulations controlling the development of land. I then set my economic intuition against 
existing literature.  
Phil Jones and James Evans argue that the idea of urban regimes was developed in the United 
States through the work of Stephen Elkin (1987), examining the city of Dallas, and Clarence 
Stone (1989) looking at Atlanta. Both authors examined in great detail the development of a 
long-term relationship between the city council and local businesses to promote the economic 
development of the city as a whole (Urban Regeneration in the UK, Phil Jones, James Evans, 
2008 ). It may not have been a regular subject at dinner tables around the country, but in the 
last couple of years, many of the UK’s cities have been undergoing a period of radical structural 
reform as powers and finances have been transferred gradually from national to local 
government. These reforms have culminated in the City Devolution programme, which now 
covers ten cities and regions across the UK, and the creation of the Northern Powerhouse, to 
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balance the London and South East economic powerhouse. Phil Jones states, that “land-use 
planning is <…> the most important form of local regulatory intervention in the economy, as 
it has the power to alter the physical landscape of cities”. “On the other hand, the increasing 
pressure of development demands that planning control needs to be both efficient and capable 
of ensuring good buildings and environments are created” (Remaking Birmingham, The visual 
culture of urban regeneration, Liam Kennedy, 2004). 
There can be no doubt the UK economy itself, and the housing market as a considerable fraction 
of it, is going to be affected by economic fallout as the withdrawal from the EU, the only 
question is how deeply and for how long the impact will be feasible. Cities are increasingly 
seen as the engines of economic growth and their response to the UK’s withdrawal from the 
EU will be key to limiting its economic impact. The wisest cities will already be reaching out 
to local businesses, universities, and investors to assess the range of possible scenarios resulting 
from Brexit, and planning accordingly. Referendum results present a number of issues, but there 
will also be opportunities. City leaders, working in tandem with the private sector, universities 
and think-tanks, need to identify those opportunities and ensure appropriate plans are put in 
place to realise them. Local government is best placed to do this with devolved powers. For 
these reasons, devolution as a policy objective should continue. The Plan for Britain needs to 
be seen in a wider domestic policy context. The Brexit process gives added impetus to solving 
several major policy challenges, not least around housing. The primary objective of the current 
research work is to assess the gap in the already existing study on the implications of Brexit on 
the UK housing market. The gap is formed by the relative modernness of the referendum vote 
on and therefore lack of information on Brexit, uncertainty caused by the unclarified regulation 
and non-availability of published literature on the subject. The Conservatives are bringing in a 
Repeal Bill. This will end the primacy of EU law in the UK. This Repeal Bill is supposed to 
incorporate all EU legislation into UK law in one lump, after which the government will decide 
over a period of time which parts to keep, change or remove. 
 
Labour had said they would scrap the Repeal Bill if they won the election but they lost. They 
now are demanding a number of changes to the Repeal Bill before they'll support it. It may not 
have been a regular subject at dinner tables around the country, but in the last couple of years, 
many of the UK’s cities have been undergoing a period of radical structural reform as powers 
and finances have been transferred gradually from national to local government. These reforms 
have culminated in the City Devolution programme, which now covers ten cities and regions 
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across the UK, and the creation of the Northern Powerhouse, to balance the London and South 
East economic powerhouse. At the time of writing, there is significant trepidation the events of 
the last few days could put these reforms at risk. The vote to leave the European Union (‘EU’) 
will impact upon the economies of cities and metropolitan areas. This impact will be felt acutely 
by local authority teams in cities, by businesses operating in cities, and by investors who fund 
development in cities. 
 
The political uncertainty which is a by-product of the Referendum, creates short-term 
uncertainty about the prospects for the City Devolution programme. There is at least a risk the 
process of devolution could be slowed or even halted as the political parties work through 
leadership changes and ensuing policy is realigned. For those places yet to start a formal City 
Devolution process, there is a worry the window may have started to close. 
 
2.3 Infrastructure 
 
David Lidington’s (UK’s Chancellor 2017-2018, speech made in autumn 2017) sstatement 
speech included a commitment to investment in infrastructure and innovation, and that between 
1.0%-1.2% of GDP will be invested in the recommendations of the National Infrastructure 
Commission (0.8% at present). The £23 billion National Productivity Investment Fund (NPIF) 
programme announced will be targeted at four areas to improve productivity: Housing, 
Transport, Digital Communications and Research and Development. The £2.3bn new Housing 
Infrastructure Fund is part of the NPIF, and is allocated to “provide infrastructure targeted at 
unlocking new private house building in the areas where housing need is greatest.” Further 
infrastructure spend included a £1.1bn to upgrade local roads/public transport; and £1bn for 
digital infrastructure.  
 
As with many spheres of the United Kingdom’s built environment, infrastructure relies on 
European Union funding. On 4 January 2017, Environment Secretary Andrea Leadsom 
announced that “the remaining European funding from the Rural Development Programme for 
England (RDPE) Growth Programme will be launched on a national call. GM RDPE allocation 
is £415,000 (open call until the funding is allocated) supporting small tourism infrastructure 
projects in GM”.  
For UK infrastructure, the Brexit vote may in the short term mean a slowdown in investment, 
due partially to the uncertainty and fluctuations in GBP. Andrea Colantonio and Tim Dixon 
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delineate the (Urban Regeneration & Social Sustainability: Best practice from European 
cities, Andrea Colantonio, Tim Dixon, 2011.) 
 
The UK’s global competitiveness will be hampered unless Ministers tackle the major 
infrastructure challenge. The Government must seek out and entice private investors. This is 
key to improving our productivity and regional rebalancing in the UK, whilst enabling us to 
become an even greater global gateway for trade and tourism beyond Brexit. 
 
The United Kingdom’s Government has initiated some six major projects, the so-called ‘6 H’s’: 
HS2, Hinckley, Heathrow, Highways, Housing and Heritage (from the discussion held at the 
National Housing Federation, 2017). The complexity of delivering these alongside each other, 
with pressure on costs, labour and material supplies, cannot be underestimated. The largest gap 
however is attracting private finance for the plethora of projects in the National Infrastructure 
Delivery Plan, many of which are smaller, regional game changers. 
 
 
 
Picture 16 - A model for urban finance. Urban Regeneration & Social Sustainability: Best 
practice from European cities, Andrea Colantonio, Tim Dixon, 2011. 
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2.4 Immigration 
 
And if you’re one of those people who lost their job, 
who stayed in work but on reduced hours, took a pay 
cut as household bills rocketed, or - and I know a lot of 
people don’t like to admit this - someone who finds 
themselves out of work or on lower wages because of 
low-skilled immigration, life simply doesn’t seem fair. 
- Theresa May's conference speech, 2016 
 
It is intuitive mass immigration has an effect is housing. More than one third of all new housing 
demand in Britain is caused by immigration. And there is evidence without the demand caused 
by mass immigration, house prices could be ten per cent lower over a twenty year period 
(Dhingra, S., G. Ottaviano, T. Sampson and J. Van Reenen (2016a) ‘Dhingra, S., G. Ottaviano, 
T. Sampson and J. Van Reenen (2016a) ‘The Consequences of Brexit for UK Trade and Living 
Standards’ CEP Brexit Analysis No. 5 ). Hostility to and disapproval of immigration was one 
of the key instruments in UE Referendum vote rhetoric and the main driver of Britons’ vote on 
June 23rd to leave the EU. Yet restriction migration will be both complicated and expensive. 
 
The second reason used in favour of control of immigration is it’s impact on infrastructure and 
public services. It seems obvious immigration should have an impact on the availability and 
cost of housing, the transport system, the National Health Service or the number of school 
places. But in the past, the government impact assessments didn’t measure the effects of more 
immigration or determine where its effects would be felt the most. “Facts like these need to be 
carefully considered, and I look forward to seeing the results of the work we’re doing in the 
home office, but I think we can already be confident mass immigration puts pressure on 
infrastructure and public services.” – Theresa May on immigration and housing, 2016. 
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Picture 18 - Kallaugher, K., 2016. Immigration cartoon, The Economist. 
 
‘The desirability of sizeable immigration is a matter 
more of values than of economics. It is not a choice 
between wealth and poverty, but of the sort of country 
one desires to inhabit.’  
- Martin Wolf, chief economics commentator of the 
Financial Times 
 
Normally, economists tend to agree net migration comes with a range of economic benefits, 
and the impact on wages and unemployment rates is rather limited, if not secondary. Since 
migrants tend to be university-educated, of working age, with higher or equal spending power, 
compared to natives, and therefore are net contributors to the government’s finances.  
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Picture 19 - Education and Immigration status, Dhingra, S., G. Ottaviano, T. Sampson and J. 
Van Reenen (2016) ‘The Consequences of Brexit for UK Trade and Living Standards’ CEP 
Brexit Analysis No. 5 
 
The sizable amount of current academic literature examines interconnectedness of immigration, 
unemployment and housing supply. (Wadsworth, 2015; Portes, 2016a; Centre for European 
Reform, 2016; Dustmann et al, 2005, among others). The conclusion of this research is that the 
large increase in immigration in the UK has not significantly harmed the job and wage prospects 
of UK-born workers. Counterintuitively, some literature refers to the general perception by the 
locals (British-born or holders of the citizenship) that immigrants are given better treatment 
when applying for social housing. Battiston et al (2013) show that controlling for demographic, 
economic and regional circumstances, immigrant households are less likely to be in social 
housing than their UK-born counterparts. Lack of access to social housing has more to do with 
the falling supply of social housing.  
Whereas the local population fears immigrants take up job positions and drag down wages, 
there exists another half of an equation – migrants create their own demand, work places and 
businesses. ‘Large scale immigration is consistent with rising real wages, though it is not 
guaranteed as recent experience shows’ (Pettinger, 2016). As well as increasing the supply of 
labour, there will be an increase in the demand for labour – relating to the increased spending 
within the economy. Ceteris paribus, net migration should lead to an increase in real GDP. The 
impact on real GDP per capita is less certain. Though, what is the impact on housing? And what 
would be the impact of large scale migration in the UK, where there is a shortage of housing? 
 
Decreased net immigration as a result of tightened entrance regulations would inevitably bring 
down the demand for housing. According to Oxford Migration survey 74% of recent migrants 
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(those who have been in the UK for five years or less) were in the private rented sector in the 
first quarter of 2015. Furthermore, the overall decrease in the number of households and 
rentable demand would put downward pressure on house prices too; weakened demand for 
renting will decrease number of buy to let landlords looking to profit from weakening demand 
and falling rent prices. With net immigration increasing number of UK households, demand for 
housing will rise.  
 
There also exists a belief immigrants force the local population out of the social housing. It 
goes without saying, however, that not all migrants are eligible for social housing. In order to 
be eligible, migrants must have, in general, settlement status or be a national of the EEA (taken 
from the Housing Rights Information website for details on the different housing rights of 
migrants). Governmental report on Immigration states that 17% of UK-born and 18% of 
foreign-born individuals live in social housing (2016). While there are variations, these 
participation rates are somewhat stable over time. The research also shows, women are on 
average slightly more likely than men to live in social housing. This gender difference largely 
holds for UK-born/UK-nationals and foreign-born. 
 
 
Picture 20 - Social Housing, Cables Wynd House, Leith. Trainspotting, 2016. [film] Directed 
by Danny Boyle. UK: TriStar Pictures. 
 
Prime Minister Theresa May has said one of the main messages she has taken from the Leave 
vote is the British people want to see a reduction in immigration. She has said this will be a 
focus of Brexit negotiations as she remains committed to getting net migration ⎯ the difference 
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between the numbers entering and leaving the country ⎯ down to a "sustainable" level, which 
she defines as being below 100,000 a year. Labour has said the free movement of people has to 
end when Britain leaves the EU. It has yet to reveal what system it would use for people who 
come to the UK for work or study. Net migration to the UK was estimated to be 248,000 in 
2016 ⎯ a fall of 84,000 from 2015. The total number of people moving to the UK was made 
up of 264,000 non-EU citizens, 250,000 EU citizens and 74,000 British citizens. Balancing 
117,000 EU citizens left the UK, out of an estimated total of 339,000 emigrants. 
 
The UK is endowed with an exceptionally strong university sector that attracts many bright 
international students, academics and research funding (AdiEU: The Impact of Brexit on UK 
Cities, 2016). The economies of many cities are dependent on these vital economic assets: the 
large numbers of European students who study in these cities exercise significant spending 
power; the intellectual prowess of European researchers and students contribute to universities’ 
research and development strengths; and the EU’s research funds invest heavily in UK 
academic institutions. The UK’s decision to leave the EU will indefinitely impact on all these 
dynamics. Each year, universities generate over £73bn for the UK economy, and support nearly 
380,000 jobs . Almost £4bn of this sum is generated by students from EU countries. More than 
1.8mn undergraduate and postgraduate students are registered in the UK. Almost 25% of the 
number are overseas students (436,000), and of which, approximately 125,000 are from the EU.  
 
There is a consensus that there are positive effects of trade and foreign direct investment on UK 
productivity. But there is somewhat less of a consensus on the effect of immigration on 
productivity. There is strong evidence of positive effects for more educated immigrants (for 
example, Ottaviano et al, 2016, for UK service productivity; Ortega and Peri, 2014). Indeed, 
most studies show insignificant or positive effects of overall immigration. For example, 
Felbermayr et al (2010) concludes that a 10% increase in the immigrant stock leads to a per 
capita income gain of 2.2%.  
 
Migrants hence leave countries with weaker work ethic and thus lower salaries and move to 
ones with higher efficiency; this way, productivity increases throughout the world. Migrants 
also contribute to the skill-set of a country’s population and might fill it breaches in expertise 
and experience. 
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Picture 21 - Proportion of UK and EU nationals in each region, 2015, Dhingra, S., G. 
Ottaviano, T. Sampson and J. Van Reenen (2016) ‘The Consequences of Brexit for UK Trade 
and Living Standards’ CEP Brexit Analysis No. 5 
 
There are more international students studying and contributing to the British economy than 
the populations of a mid-sized city like Liverpool, Edinburgh or Bristol. The picture 21 above 
gives an indication of how those students are distributed across some of the major regions of 
the UK. To date, EU students have benefited from the same funding regime as UK students. 
They are charged Scottish (£nil), Welsh (up to £3,900), Northern Irish (£3,925), or English (up 
to £9,000) fees, and benefit from access to student loan finance. These fees represent a very 
significant discount on the fees charged to non-EU students: overseas students pay up to 
£35,000 a year for clinical courses, and up to £16,000 for arts courses. It is likely EU students 
currently studying or applying for 2016/7 entry will not face changes to funding or fees. But 
beyond , universities are likely to face stiffer competition to attract EU students. In addition, 
the Erasmus Plus student mobility programme may no longer fund EU students at UK academic 
institution which would also contribute to a reduction in students from the EU. The picture 22 
comprises a composition of the EU immigrants in the United Kingdom, segmented by 
nationality. 
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Picture 22 - EU immigrants by nationality, 2015. Dhingra, S., G. Ottaviano, T. Sampson and 
J. Van Reenen (2016) ‘The Consequences of Brexit for UK Trade and Living Standards’ CEP 
Brexit Analysis No. 5 
One of the main polemic of the Labour party in 2016-2017 it would guarantee the rights of EU 
citizens living in the UK to stay there on "day one" of a Labour government. EU nationals with 
a right to permanent residence, which is granted after they have lived in the UK for five years, 
should not see their rights affected after Brexit. The government needs to focus on the 
‘educational supply chain’, which stretches back from employers via training bodies and 
schools, into secondary education. Without the alignment of these to increase and upskill the 
workforce, our construction ambitions will be frustrated. The industrial strategy is an obvious 
vehicle for this. Ministers can signal their intent through a radical reform and repositioning of 
CITB. 
 
Britain can change the expensive and malfunctioning system that offers an open door to EU 
migrants and blocks other non-EU migrants could contribute to the UK economy. Filipa Sá, a 
labour economist and academic, found immigration actually lowers, rather than raises, house 
prices in some areas. In a 2014 Economic Journal article, “Immigration and house prices in the 
UK”, Sá wrote: “an increase of immigrants equal to 1% of the initial local population leads to 
a 1.7% reduction in house prices, based on immigration data from the Labour Force Survey”. 
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This article studies the effect of immigration on house prices in the UK. It ﬁnds immigration 
has a negative effect on house prices and presents evidence this negative effect is due to the 
mobility response of the native population. Natives respond to immigration by moving to 
different areas and those who leave are at the top of the wage distribution. This generates a 
negative income effect on housing demand and pushes down house prices. The negative effect 
of immigration on house prices is driven by local areas where immigrants have lower education. 
The UK experienced a large increase in both immigration and house prices in recent years. In 
the mid-1990s immigrants accounted for just over 8% of the working age population in England 
and Wales. Today, they account for less than 13%. 
 
The general conclusion is immigration has only small adverse effects on the united kingdom’s 
housing market, housing prices and their connection to unemployment. For the UK, this result 
is conﬁrmed by Dustmann et al. (2005), who ﬁnd no strong evidence immigration has overall 
effects on employment, participation and wages. Dustmann et al. (2013) estimate wage effects 
along the distribution of wages. They ﬁnd immigration depresses wages below the 20th 
percentile of the wage distribution, but leads to slight wage increases in the upper part of the 
wage distribution. Overall, the wage effect of immigration is slightly positive. The authors 
sugges this may be because immigrants are paid less than the value of what they contribute to 
production, generating a surplus which may beneﬁt native wages.  
 
These areas have often been associated with unsafe neighbourhoods and urban violence, either 
because they are places where crimes are committed or because people find shelter in the area 
after crimes have been committed (Jacquier et al., 2007). The most successful programmes of 
regeneration are those that recognise the importance of promoting cultural diversity. Also key 
finding in favour of immigration is that positive treatment and inclusion of the ethnic, 
immigrant communities that form part of the overall community, benefits the neighbourhood’s 
well-being. One study shows that residents living in walkable neighbourhoods exhibit at least 
80% greater levels of social capital than those living in car-dependent ones (The Social Capital 
And The Built Environment: The Importance of Walkable Neighbourhoods, Kevin M. Leyden, 
2003). That is something to consider, given that only a half of Brits know their neighbour’s 
name. This view also implies that ‘integration’ is important. Historically, a lack of integration 
is perhaps part of the reason for some of the key problems associated with regeneration, and 
this is where British cities show similar behaviour to the European ones: research compares 
Barcelona (including neighbouring areas such as Sant Adriá de Besós) and Cardiff (Urban 
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Regeneration & Social Sustainability: Best practice from European cities, Andrea Colantonio, 
Tim Dixon, 2011.).  
 
2.5 Trade 
 
After discussing migration, it is natural to cover possible after-Brexit changes in trade. Oddly 
enough, there exists a striking lack of literature on the subject of Changes in Trade with respect 
to real estate in post-Brexit context. When speaking about trade, Ortega F. and G. Peri (2014), 
write: “migration acts much like trade, as people tend to move to countries where they can be 
more productive and earn higher incomes.” There are also questions about what would happen 
to Britain's position as global financial centre, without access to the single market, and the land 
border between the UK and Ireland. There is also concern Brits living abroad in the EU could 
lose residency rights and access to free emergency health care. 
 
Though there is a shortage of literature on Trade due to vague uncertainty caused by Brexit, its’ 
importance cannot be underestimated. A measurable amount of materials, utilized it production 
of the United Kingdom’s built environment, is exported from abroad. I reviewed monthly 
reports (monthly bulletins) Building Materials and Components: Monthly Statistics taken from 
www.gov.uk and the Building Materials webpage 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/building-materials-and-components-monthly-
statistics-2012), to compare the changes in price, and import and export values in the post-
Brexit time. This section brings together all documents relating to building materials and 
components monthly statistics. Interestingly, none of the observed reports mentions, in any 
form, Brexit, potential exit of the UK from the European Economic Area, or market 
Uncertainty. However, it is possible to look at statistics on the trade with The economic 
outcomes largely depend on the scenario which Britain will choose when exiting the European 
Economic Area. Below is the table showing how much of construction materials are coming 
from imports. 
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Table 1 - UK Trade of Construction Materials with EU and Non-EU Countries, Monthly 
Statistics of Building Materials and Components, January 2017. 
 
According to the governmental report of February 2017, “The top five exported materials in 
2015 accounted for 37% of total construction material exports. The top five imported 
construction materials in 2015 accounted for 31% of total construction material imports. “ 
 
Table 2- Top 5 UK Export and Import Markets for Construction Materials in 2015, Monthly 
Statistics of Building Materials and Components, January 2017. 
 
The governmental report outlines, that the top five export markets covered 47% of total 
construction materials exports in 2015. The top five countries contributed most are China, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. Whereas China is only going to profit from Britain 
Exiting the European Economic Area, trade chains with the remaining countries are likely to 
be affected. A highly positivist pro-leave report “The consequences of a British exit from the 
European Union”, created by European Movement International, offers as a the post-Brexit 
agenda to “open up to China, USA, India and Indonesia”. While on the macroeconomic level 
this will contribute to the trade liberalization, the quality of exports are unlikely to stay the 
same. 
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The total value of 18% of all imports are from China. When it comes to another side of the 
medal, The Republic of Ireland remains the largest receiving market, despite having shrunk 
from a pre-recession peak of 27% of total exports in 2007, to 13% in 2015. In 2015, the report 
indicates, the top 5 import markets comprised 49% of total construction materials imports in 
2015. Compared to pre- recession levels in 2007, the share of total UK construction material 
exports going to the EU has declined from 70% to 58%. This is a likely outcome of the market’s 
instability and occurred geopolitical situation. Compared to pre- recession levels in 2007, the 
share of total UK construction material exports going to the EU has declined from 70% to 58%.  
The trade deficit was historically at its smallest throughout the 1990s, with a mean of £0.3 
billion over this period. This trade deficit was 24% of the value of imports. Currently (Quarter 
3 2016), the trade deficit is £2,288 million, 58% of the value of imports.  
 
 
Graph 1 - Exports and Imports of Construction Materials, UK. Monthly Statistics of Building 
Materials and Components, January 2017. 
 
As of 2016, a dropdown in imports and a simultaneous increase in exports is seen. The two 
tables drawn below summarie by-monthly change in the prices of the materials, utilized in 
construction. Imports of construction materials increased by £144 million in the third quarter 
of 2016 (to £3,929 million) compared to the previous quarter, an increase of 3.8%. Exports of 
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construction materials increased in the third quarter of 2016 by £46 million (to £1,642 million), 
a 2.9% increase. As a result, the trade deficit widened by £98 million to £2,288 million in 
Quarter 3 2016, an increase of 4.5% Over the period from Quarter 1 1984 to Quarter 3 2016, 
construction materials imports have increased, on average, by 3.6% per quarter. Over the same 
period, exports increased by an average of 1.9% per quarter.  
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Table 3 - Change in prices (a). Monthly Statistics of Building Materials and Components 
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Table 4 - Change in prices (b). Monthly Statistics of Building Materials and Components. 
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Table 5 - Construction materials experiencing the greatest price increases and decreases in the 
12 months to December 2016, UK. Monthly Statistics of Building Materials and Components, 
January 2017. 
 
According to the academic literature, house prices are “the sum of adding up land costs, 
construction costs and builder’s profit” (Ball 1983, pp. 112ff.). Therefore, significant 
fluctuations in the prices and import values of construction materials, observed in this chapter, 
and caused by Brexit-imposed instability, have a direct impact on the real estate sector in the 
United Kingdom.  
 
 
Table 6 - Total Yearly and Monthly changes. Monthly Statistics of Building Materials and 
Components, January 2017. 
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The single market is seen by its advocates as the EU's biggest achievement and one of the main 
reasons it was set up in the first place. Britain was a member of a free trade area in Europe 
before it joined what was then known as the common market. In a free trade area countries can 
trade with each other without paying tariffs ⎯ but it is not a single market because the member 
states do not have to merge their economies together. It can be seen from the material observed, 
that the housing market in the United Kingdom depends on exports from the European Union, 
as 4 out of five main construction suppliers are from the EU. It can also be easily established, 
that there has been an unwelcomed rise in prices imposed by the political instability and 
possible changes in supply chains as the UK’s trade partners are promptly wrapping up 
businesses with the UK and moving offices from London to Continental Europe. 
 
2.6 Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) comprises investments from outside a country to start up new 
subsidiaries, to expand existing establishments or to acquire local companies. The UK is a 
major recipient of FDI with an estimated stock value of over £1 trillion, about half of which is 
from other members of the European Union (EU), according to UK Trade and Investment. Only 
the United States and China receive more FDI than the UK (Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 2017, The impact of Brexit on foreign 
investment in the UK). FDI has an undeniably positive economic effect of the countries’ 
economies as it supports production, which constitutes country’s output and wages. FDI entails 
direct benefits, since overseas firms are perceived to be more productive and pay higher wages 
than the home-based ones. However, FDI could also bring indirect benefits as the new 
technological and managerial know-how in foreign firms can be adopted by domestic firms, 
often through multinationals’ supply chain (Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare, 2009). FDI can also 
increase competitive pressure, which forces managers to improve their performance.  
 
There are at least three reasons why FDI might fall if the UK left the EU:  
 
1. First, being fully in the Single Market makes the UK an attractive export platform for 
multinationals as they do not bear potentially large costs from tariff and non-tariff 
barriers when exporting to the rest of the EU.  
2. Second, multinationals have complex supply chains and many co-ordination costs 
between their headquarters and local branches. These would become more difficult to 
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manage if the UK left the EU. For example, component parts would be subject to 
different regulations and costs; and intra-firm staff transfers would become more 
difficult with tougher migration controls.  
3. Third, uncertainty over the shape of the future trade arrangements between the UK and 
the EU would also tend to dampen FDI.  
 
A number of factors determine where firms choose to locate and invest. Bigger and richer 
markets tend to attract more firms, and want to be close to their customers. The UK has strong 
rule of law, flexible labour markets and a highly educated workforce, all of which make it an 
attractive FDI location whether or not it is in the EU. But since EU membership reduces trade 
and investment costs, it is likely to have an impact even after controlling for these other factors. 
To estimate the size of the effect of being in the EU on FDI, we provide a new empirical analysis 
– see Bruno et al (2016) in the Technical Appendix to this report. It is a statistical model based 
on the bilateral FDI flows between 34 OECD countries from 1985 to 2013. The model estimates 
why foreign investors choose to invest in the UK, as opposed to other countries such as 
Germany, France or the United States. It is similar to the ‘gravity model’ is the standard way 
of estimating bilateral flows of exports and imports. 
 
Bilateral FDI flows between any pair of countries depend on their respective market size 
(measured by GDP), the geographical distance between them and other factors such as GDP 
per capita. The model addresses the question of how much more FDI would flow between two 
countries if the sender or the recipient joins the EU, once all these factors are taken into account. 
Since many FDI determinants – such as geographical distance and culture – are broadly stable 
over time, we can fully control for them by looking only at changes in FDI and its determinants. 
The data show there is always a statistically significant positive effect of being in the EU on 
inward FDI. The magnitude ranges from a 14% to 38% increase in FDI depending on the exact 
statistical method used with an average of 28% across the main three methods. These estimates 
are also consistent with those in Campos and Coricelli (2015), who find an impact of 25% to 
30% on FDI flows from EU membership using an alternative method comparing the evolution 
of UK FDI with a set of matched countries as a comparison group. Similarly, Straathof et al 
(2008) find EU membership increases inward FDI stocks by 14% from non-EU countries and 
by 28% from other EU members (using a gravity model but with earlier data). Being a member 
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) like Switzerland does not restore the FDI 
benefits of being in the EU. In fact, we find no statistical difference between being in EFTA 
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compared with being completely outside the EU like the United States or Japan. So striking a 
comprehensive free trade deal after Brexit is not a good substitute for full EU membership. By 
comparison, Baier et al (2008) estimate EU membership leads to trade with other EU members 
increasing by a quarter or more (compared with EFTA membership). So the magnitude of the 
FDI effect on Brexit is in the same ballpark as the effect on overall trade.  
 
There is much evidence FDI brings benefits in terms of enhanced productivity. For example, 
Bloom et al (2012) find multinationals boost productivity in UK establishments through 
enhanced technologies and management practices. On top of this direct effect, Haskel et al 
(2007) find there are foreign investment “spillovers” to other, UK-owned firms in the same 
industry. But to get at the nation-wide impact of FDI on output, we need to factor in the many 
complex ways in which FDI affects people and firms in multiple parts of the economy. This is 
a tricky task, but fortunately we can draw on the work of Alfaro et al (2004), who estimate the 
effect of changes in FDI on growth rates across 73 countries. They find increases in FDI have 
a large positive impact on GDP growth, especially for countries like the UK have a highly 
developed financial sector. To be very conservative, we assume a scenario where the Brexit-
induced fall in FDI lasts only for 10 years and then reverts to its current level. Using the average 
of the estimates in the Technical Appendix combined with Alfaro et al’s estimates implies a 
fall in real income of about 3.4% (see the Annex for more detail). Looking at the wider range, 
we obtain a fall in income of between 1.8% and 4.3%. The magnitude of our FDI effect on 
income, of 3.4%, is larger than our static estimates of the losses from trade (between 1.3% and 
2.6% in Dhingra et al, 2016). The effect of changes in FDI is equivalent to a loss of GDP of 
around £2,200 per household. Using earlier data, Pain and Young (2004) estimate EU 
membership added 2.25% to UK GDP via FDI. As FDI into the UK has grown over time, we 
find this channel is becoming more important for income. Such macroeconomic analysis is 
useful for a bird’s-eye view of the impact of Brexit on national income via lower FDI. Firm-
level studies will tend to underestimate the positive impact of FDI as they focus on the 
productivity of the foreign firm itself or can examine only a limited number of mechanisms for 
the FDI “spillovers” (for example, firms who are in the same industry as the multinational or 
are suppliers or customers). Nevertheless, identifying the causal effects of FDI on economy-
wide productivity is intrinsically very difficult and our estimates are subject to considerably 
more uncertainty than the impact of Brexit on FDI (or trade) itself. So, to obtain a more granular 
view of the way key sectors may be affected, we analyse two important UK industries in more 
detail: cars and financial services. 
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2.7 Housing Prices 
 
As many of us are aware, there are two most British of conversations – the weather and house 
prices. Maybe it is because Britain have just experienced the wettest winter since records began 
in 1910 (according to the UK National Weather Service), or maybe it is because house prices 
have experienced a remarkable renaissance. Once again, the whole nation appears to be focused 
on the performance of the UK housing market. Jon Cunliffe, appointed in a Deputy Governor 
for Financial Stability at the Bank of England (BoE), called housing “the brightest light” on the 
risk dashboard of the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), while the vast majority of questions 
at the BoE’s May 2014 Inflation Report press conference centred around the prospects of a 
bubble having developed in the UK housing market. With that in mind, what is the state of the 
UK housing market? And, more importantly, what are its investment implications? 
 
 
Graph 2 - UK house price inflation: main scenario projections with and without Brexit, ONS 
historic data, PwC analysis, 2017. 
 
At the same time, average house prices increased from just over £60,000 in 1995 to nearly 
£180,000 in 2007. This was followed by a reduction as a result of the ﬁnancial crisis and a 
recovery in 2010. Behind this overall evolution there is substantial variation across local 
authorities. Table 1 lists the local authorities with the largest share of immigrants in the working 
age population in 2010. Not surprisingly, this share is largest in some London boroughs where 
immigrants account for the majority of the population. Outside London, there are several local 
authorities where over 20% of the population is foreign born. Table 2 shows the local authorities 
with the highest average house prices in 2010. The highest prices are registered in London 
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boroughs, with Kensington and Chelsea registering an average price well above £800,000. 
There is a large literature looking at the labour market impact of immigration. 
 
 
Graph 3 - UK house price inflation – the potential impact of the Brexit vote, PwC analysis 
based on ONS house price index, 2017. 
 
In the second quarter of 2016, the housing prices rose dramatically, heightening the pro-Brexit 
voters’ reaction against migrants. Tejvan Pettinger, an Oxford-based economist, observes: 
‘Given rapid rise in house prices since mid 1990s and corresponding rise in number of 
immigrants, it is hard to avoid the conclusion, levels of net migration are having, at least, some 
effect on exacerbating the UK housing crisis.’ Nonetheless, the number of studies proves high 
levels of net immigration can lead to lower house prices in certain locations, as local people are 
forced to seek housing elsewhere. Rob Paral & Associates also found there was little apparent 
relationship between recent immigration and rise in housing prices at the regional, state, or 
county level. 
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Table 7 - Tejvan Pettinger, 2016. Real house prices 1975 - 2016. 
One area where we may be concerned is the effect of immigration on house prices. The UK’s 
terrible track record of building insufficient houses does mean that the population increase 
generated by immigrants adds to housing pressure. But the failure to create enough housing 
supply would be a problem even in the absence of EU immigration. It is rooted in the failure of 
the UK planning system to make appropriate infrastructure decisions more generally (LSE 
Growth Commission, 2013; Hilber, 2015). Having said this, the empirical evidence does not 
find positive effects of immigration on local house prices (Sa, 2015).  
 
Growth in home prices in the primary and secondary market is the subject of continuous interest 
of central banks and regulators, as it rapidly translates into changes in real estate development 
production, drives housing cycles (see Augustyniak et al., 2013) and generates risk for the 
banking sector. The stiffness of supply in short term can cause pricing shock and also create 
price bubbles.  
 
All risk assets, including global REITs have experienced substantial price declines as equity 
risk premiums have risen in response to heightened political turmoil and an uncertain economic 
future for the UK and the European Union. Currently, UK listed property is the weakest 
subsector despite lower leverage and sound direct property fundamentals. This reflects the 
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substantial capitalisation rate compression we’ve seen since 2012 and the dramatic reversal of 
implied valuations with recent price movements.  
 
 
Table 8 - Bloomerg, 2017. Markets react. 
 
2.8 GDP and Output 
 
David Cameron, his Chancellor George Osborne and many other senior figures who wanted to 
stay in the EU predicted an immediate economic crisis if the UK voted to leave. House prices 
would fall, there would be a recession with a big rise in unemployment ⎯ and an emergency 
Budget would be needed to bring in the large cuts in spending would be needed. 
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The pound did slump the day after the referendum ⎯ and remains around 15% lower against 
the dollar and 10% down against the euro ⎯ but the predictions of immediate doom have not 
proved accurate with the UK economy estimated to have grown 1.8% in 2016, second only to 
Germany's 1.9% among the world's G7 leading industrialised nations. 
 
Inflation has risen ⎯ to 2.6% in April ⎯ its highest rate for three and a half years, but 
unemployment has continued to fall, to stand at an 11 year low of 4.8%. Annual house price 
increases have fallen from 9.4% in June but were still at an inflation-beating 4.1% in March, 
according to official ONS figures. If Britain left the EU, it would win back its net contribution 
to the EU’s budget, which the Treasury estimates will be 0.5%of GDP per year between 2014 
and 2020. UK GDP could be 2.2% lower in 2030 if Britain leaves the EU and fails to strike a 
deal with the EU or reverts into protectionism. In a best case scenario, under which the UK 
manages to enter into liberal trade arrangements with the EU and the rest of the world, whilst 
pursuing large-scale deregulation at home, Britain could be better off by 1.6% of GDP in 2030.  
 
 
Graph 4 - Cumulative house price impact of Brexit vote relative to pre-Brexit outlook (by 
2018), PwC analysis based on ONS house price index, 2016. 
 
2.9 Uncertainty 
When we talk about Brexit uncertainty, it's not 
necessarily the fact we're leaving Europe, it's the impact 
might have on the economy [which is damaging buyer 
sentiment] 
Lucian Cook, head of residential research at Savills 
 
In 2015 the median house price in England and Wales was roughly nine times median earnings, 
probably the highest level ever. Young people are bearing much of the burden: in the past 25 
years the rate of home-ownership has fallen by 30 percentage points among 25- to 34-year-olds. 
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Small wonder that Sajid Javid, the communities secretary, on February 7th boldly declared that 
the housing market was “broken”.  
 
When it comes to pricing, analysts say the main effect of the vote has been in London, which 
had previously been experiencing a house price boom. Looking at the broader economy, a key 
factor will be inflation, which has already begun setting in because of the decline in sterling. As 
Article 50 is triggered, the property market nervously awaits exit negotiations. Britain’s broken 
and cruel housing market may be the country’s most grotesque inequality. In 1997 it took a 
middle-income household three years to save up a deposit to buy a house; today it takes 20 
years. 
 
When it comes to pricing, analysts say the main effect of the vote has been in London, which 
had previously been experiencing a house price boom. Looking at the broader economy, a key 
factor will be inflation, which has already begun setting in because of the decline. “Government 
can minimise uncertainty over the EU exit negotiations by laying out a clear timeline and set 
of ambitions. Certainty and stability are required for the development pipeline.  
 
In the short term, Brexit will produce an element of uncertainty which is hated by all markets. 
Volatility is to be expected in liquid investments such as shares and listed debt in the capital 
markets and in the value of the pound sterling. Such effects will be far less severe upon demand 
in a relatively illiquid asset class such as commercial real estate, where an investment pause/ 
breathing space, rather than severe volume or price falls, is the worst impact to be expected. 
.
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3. Materials and Methods 
3.1 Methodology  
The mean of conducting the empirical research and gathering the experiential data for the 
second part of the current dissertation is done in a form of a questionnaire. From May 2014 to 
October 2014 I worked as a Junior Consultant in one of the biggest, most efficient and 
successful real estate companies, Colliers International. My position was Junior Consultant in 
Investment services and Luxury Real Estate department. My primary professional focus was 
curation of the most innovative and Europe-oriented projects, taking place in St Petersburg, 
Russia. This professional experience introduced me to many great professionals in the areas of 
Market Valuation, Real Estate Investment, Construction, Development, Urban Economics and 
Design. What is more important, I gained access to a great network of colleagues abroad and 
attended conferences on real estate investment, where I was introduced to the Consultants from 
Colliers International UK, Colliers International Ireland, as well as various colleagues in large 
European Units; later on, I got support from Colliers International Munich. When designing an 
empirical study on impacts of Brexit on United Kingdom’s housing market, my first and 
foremost objective was to gain real estate professionals’ opinion on the market conditions and 
oppose it to the theoretical prediction, comprised in the literature review chapter, as well as my 
own economic intuition.  
In order to gather the empirical data, I used is a Survey Monkey platform to create an easily 
accessible online questionnaire. My rationale behind that was to distribute the survey to a 
maximum amount of colleagues from Colliers International UK. I obeyed the 10-question limit 
as my goal was to create a questionnaire that can be filled in during a coffee break or lunch 
break, therefore passing the maximum amount of people without being postponed due to the 
questionnaire’s length or complicity. Some of these consultant’s salary is reaching 100 pounds 
/hour, and this is something to consider when asking to devote valuable time on helping with a 
bachelor’s thesis. I used Financial Times and the Economist’s report to formulate questions that 
would be similar to the most discussed heading of the trending Brexit articles. Now, in order to 
not dwell into populism, I asked professional opinions and also asked for suggestions. I 
designed a succinct yet comprehensive 10-question form, targeting the professionals, 
Consultants and Senior Consultants from the real estate companies. Colliers International in 
Russia works closely with Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated (further referred to as JLL) and 
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oftentimes works together on the same projects, and I profited from a network of colleagues 
and received support when writing this thesis.  
I distributed the questionnaire form to employees in the following companies: 
1. Colliers International Russia (St. Petersburg office; Moscow office) 
2. Colliers International UK (London office) 
3. Colliers International Germany (Munich office; Berlin office) 
4. JLL Russia (St. Petersburg office) 
5. JLL Germany (Munich office) 
6. JLL UK (London office) 
The invitation link was sent to the employees’ emails. The only condition for completing the 
form is either professional knowledge of the United Kingdom’s housing market, or being 
currently involved in one of the real estate projects in the UK. Since I am no longer employed 
at Colliers International, I used external mail service to reach out to colleagues; I specifically 
contacted head HR Managers to monitor that the email with a survey link would not be 
categorised as “spam”. The questionnaire comprises a market sentiment survey, aiming at 
collecting opinions, experience and market outlook of the professionals, who operate in the 
residential sales and lettings markets. It is important to note, the questionnaire was not 
translated into German before reaching German employees as it was deemed unnecessary. 
3.2 Questionnaire’s composition  
For the sake of academic and professional value, accuracy and timeliness of the current 
dissertation, it was crucial to gather responses from the market professionals, actively involved 
into housing sales, residential development, letting and market valuation in the United 
Kingdom. Only professionals, involved at present, or having previous professional exposure to 
the housing market in Britain, were kindly asked to fill in the questionnaire. Since a negative 
sentiment towards Brexit was expected from a real estate companies’ offices in Europe, it would 
have been of no academic value when it comes to the framework of the present bachelor’s 
thesis, to compare the outlook of professionals, not employees in the field. The questionnaire 
was consciously composed with the respondents’ time in thought, and the questions were 
carefully selected to encompass most of the housing market’s tendencies, though without 
enclosing the outliers, unnecessary or irrelevant information, or being long, tedious and 
congested in formulation. The survey is exactly 10 question-long, nonetheless it incorporates 
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four most influential sections: Sales Market section, Letting Market section, Market Valuations, 
and Respondent Details. It mirrors most of the theoretical framework built in the Literature 
Review section and tests the predictions, as well as academic literature. 
 
3.2.1 Sales Market 
 
The Sales Market section opens with a question “How have average prices changed over the 
last 3 months?”. This question addresses the most recent average price variation within the past 
3 months: from April 2017 to June 2017. It is an imperative question to start a research with, 
as it is exactly a year since the referendum vote and one month since the Article 50 triggered 
on March 29, 2017. The theoretical prediction behind the question is that it mirrors uncertainty 
of the market, hostility associated with pound depreciation, overall fall in the interest rates, and 
changes in GDP and output, discussed in the Literature Review’s eponymous subsection . The 
question is carried out in a matrix with a rating scale design, four rows on eight columns. The 
respondents have to pick the price deviation in the following types of property: 1 bedroom, 2 
bedroom, 3 bedroom, 4 bedroom. I used the United Kingdom’s government website and the 
research report English Housing Survey : Housing stock report 2016 to choose the most 
common and therefore relevant types of property. The variation range to choose from is +<8%, 
+ +5 % to +8%, +2 % to +5%, stays same as an option “same”, 0 to -2%, -5 to -8%, -5 to -8% 
and -8%. It is also possible to opt n/a and proceed to further questions, ie if a respondent does 
not have data to reply. 
 
The second question of the Sales Market section is Activity indicators ⎯ How have the 
following changed over the last month? It is a matrix question, which allows to express the 
respondent’s opinion on each of the four estimates: New Buyer Enquiries, New Vendor 
Instructions And Agreed Sales. The answer options are: Down, Same, Up and Not Applicable 
which is an option for the case when there’s not enough data or knowledge on the subject. 
 
The third question - Sentiment - How do you expect the following [prices] to change? Closes 
the section. It is designed to create a market’s sentiment forecast and find out the professional 
opinion of three main topics of the current research: Prices - 3 months ahead, Sales - 3 months 
ahead and Sales - 12 months ahead. The response options are Down, Same, Up and Not 
Applicable to provide clear yet concise qualitative outlook of a general trend.  
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In order to foresee how the housing prices are going to evolve in the forecoming 12-month 
period, a more quantitative question was designed. It is a rating matrix question allows to 
allocate a price estimate, ranging from the rise on 20 percent to a drop on 20 percent on each 
of the four categories: 1 bedroom apartment, 2 bedroom apartment, 3 bedroom apartment, and 
4+ bedroom houses.  
 
3.2.2 Letting Market 
 
The Letting Market section researches the change in rents, rental demand tenants- and 
landlord’s sentiments in the aftermath of Brexit and provides a forecast of the upcoming 
changes. The first question of the Letting Market section is question number five of the survey 
- Activity indicators. It comprises an opportunity to evaluate Tenant demand - over last 3 
months, Landlord instructions - over last 3 months, and Rent expectations - 3 months ahead, 
with answers ranging from Down, Same, Up and Not Applicable. 
 
The second question of the Letting Market section, question number six is a quantitative 
overview of the changes have occurred within a year since the referendum vote: it allows to 
evaluate the demand tenancy. 
 
The last, closing question allows to forecast the change in demand over the next 12 months, the 
answer choices are changes in price: with +20% and lowering to -20%, with a five percent 
increment. 
 
3.2.3 Market Valuations 
First question of the Market Valuations asks opinion on the change of the price level in any 
given area. The reply options are: Very Expensive, Expensive, Fair value, Cheap and Very 
Cheap. It is a multiple-choice question does not imply grading. 
The ninth question is asking to express a forecast on an average annual growth in any given 
area. The response options are: Very positive, Somewhat positive, Somewhat negative and Very 
negative. 
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The tenth and last question constitutes a dropdown menu and is a query about the respondent’s 
geography, constituency and the area of expertise. It is expected that interviewed have exposure 
in all the regions covered. 
 
The options of the regions covered were: 
1. East Midlands 
2. East of England 
3. London 
4. South West 
5. West Midlands 
6. North East 
7. North West 
8. South East 
Note: It is important to note that the dropdown menu only allowed to choose from the regions 
in England. Due to the lack of expertise in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland these regions 
were removed in the experiment and thus observed only in theoretical chapter. 
 
Picture 23 - UK House Price Index for December 2017, Land Registry, Gov.uk 
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3.3 Data and Experiment 
It took overall 1 month to distribute the survey. The time frame was April 2017 – July 2017, 
for the question “How have average prices changed over the last 3 months?”. Thus, question 
“House price expectations - next 12 months?” covers timespan of July 2017 to July 2018.  
 
To exclude personal opinion bias on this highly discussed topic, no personal interviews were 
conducted. The responses on the survey show the current market trends in the housing prices 
and informed professional opinion. It is of academic interest to compare forecasts of 
professionals working in leading real estate companies with or in the United Kingdom’s 
housing market with those of researchers and the existing academics literature. 
3.4 Theoretical Prediction 
 
Before the last respondent has submitted survey responses, analysed data and studied related 
literature provided sufficient background for the theoretical predictions of the potential 
questionnaire outcomes. Long-standing theoretical framework shows that shocks in the 
economy are naturally negative towards the people, having negative equity. A home-owner has 
negative equity, when the market value of his property is lower than the value of his outstanding 
loans (The Negative Equity Map of Britain, Daniel Dorling, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 
327-342). Thus, when the housing prices go down, the negative equity ratio rises. However, the 
opposite effect is true for the other type of the home-owners. From the studied RICS surveys, 
Sills Consulting reports, London School of Economics and Political Science’s Series of CEP 
Brexit Analysis (Issues 1 to 5), it was evident that Brexit-caused uncertainty produces negative 
demand shock on the market. Britain's housing market has slowed down significantly during 
the past year. This tendency is naturally favourable for those trying to get on the ladder and less 
welcomed by those trying to sell. 
 
Official Land Registry data shows annual house price growth in the UK was 5.6% in June. 
Transactions in the real estate are also slowing, as people are hesitant. The Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors (RICS)'s monthly UK Residential Market Survey described the market as 
"stagnant" in May 2017. Fresh signs of a slowdown are expected later this year when RICS 
releases its June report. It is expected to show a further depression in the number of members 
reporting house price rises. Much of the focus has been on what's happening at the top end of 
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the market — expensive London boroughs, for instance, which have seen sharp price falls since 
the Brexit vote. Although the slowdown has been sharpest in the capital, a softening has 
occurred across the entire country. The result of last year's referendum on EU membership 
appears to have driven down the number of people moving house. UK housing transactions in 
the second half of 2016 fell by 9% compared to the same period a year before, according to 
HMRC data. 
 
Picture 24 - Price change by region in England. Land Registry, Gov.uk. 
 
Lucian Cook, head of residential research at Savills, said a combination of stagnant wage 
growth and political uncertainty linked to the Brexit vote is impacting buyer sentiment. It is 
partly about household finances, and partly about earnings potential and job security. "When 
we talk about Brexit uncertainty, it's not necessarily the fact we're leaving Europe, it's the 
impact might have on the economy [which is damaging buyer sentiment]," he told Business 
Insider (Thomas Colson, 2017) . 
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4. Results 
 
4.1 Description 
 
Within 1 month, 121 professionals responded to the survey.  
 
The infographics Empirical study 1 below reflect opinions on the price change from April 2017 
– July 2017. It is evident respondents note a minor >2% decrease in prices among all types of 
property. This is coherent with theoretical prediction that pound depreciation and market 
uncertainty drag down the prices. Some 33 professionals noted <2% increase in prices of 2-
bedrom apartments and some 31 experts noticed <2% increase in prices of three-bedroom 
apartments. This can reflect the decision of young professionals to sell their property and 
relocate to continental Europe.  
 
 
Empirical study result 1 - Page 2: Sales market section. 
 
The Empirical study result 2 shows activity of buyers and vendors (sellers). The market 
stagnation is clear: the majority of 64 people agreed that there were no increase in buyer 
inquiries. Some 49 respondents reflected no change in new vendor instructions. Absolute 
majority of 68 real estate professionals admitted there was no increase in agreed sales. This is 
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comprehensible with the theoretical framework from the chapter 2. Literature review, 
subchapter 2.9. Uncertainty: there were expected no change in the market due to improbability 
to predict whether prices will rise or fall. It is evident that for the past three months the real 
estate market in the United Kingdom have shown inactivity. 
 
 
Empirical study result 2 - Page 2: Sales market section. 
 
It is possible that retarded market conditions produced negative market expectations. Empirical 
study result 3 table shows some 56 respondents (56%) believe that there would be change in 
the reals estate market condition within 12 months to come, by April 2018. However, the 
outlook for the upcoming 3 months is more positive, some 48, 89% believe in upward rise in 
market productivity. I believe, this is correlated with the fact that prices will remain the same. 
Given continued pound depreciation, it may be attractive to foreign buyers and those citizens,  
previously indecisive towards the decision to invest in property or buy a first house.  
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Empirical study result 3 - Page 2: Sales market section. 
 
The infographic Empirical study result 4 shows the price forecast for the different types of 
property. Overall, it is evident that for 12 months to come, prices either will stay the same or 
show slight decrease on >2%. This now corresponds with Empirical study result 4, where 
market professionals predicted rise in sales: decreasing prices continue to attract buyers.  
 
For one-bedroom apartment, some 27 questioned forecasted -2.5% fall in sales and some 
consequent 25 people predicted no change. 
 
For the two bedroom-apartment 28 respondents predicted no change and 27 people even 
admitted the likelihood of rise in prices. The same responses, but for the shorter timespan on 
three months were shown in replies on question 1. This proves that questioned replied 
consistently. 
 
For the 3 bedroom apartments, 27 respondents replied they believe prices will fall on -2.5% and 
26 replied that prices are expected to go up on 2.5%. When analysing such deviation, one must 
bear in mind regional differences. It could be that in New Castle area prices experience 
downfall, while in Manchester continue to go up. The level of investment in the cities, explained 
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in the chapter 2.2 Planning is incomparable and thus can provoke price variation. This 
theoretical prediction is also supported by the map of the regional price differences (Picture 25 
- UK House Price Index for December 2017, Land Registry). 
 
 
Empirical study result 4 - Page 2: Sales market section. 
 
The biggest evidence of the market immobility is in responses on question five of the survey. 
The infographic below shows that absolute majority replied that no change is expected in all 
three directions: Tenant Demand, Landlord Instructions, Rent expectations. The replies are 
more radical than expected in the theoretical prediction or in literature review, however they do 
not deviate from the framework or the original estimation. 
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Empirical study result 5 - Page 3: Lettings market section. 
 
The question Empirical study result 6 addressed differences in demand with a timeline of April 
2017 to July 2017. The infographics is shown below. 
 
For one-bedroom apartments, the leading amount of people estimate there was no change in 
demand in the past 3 months. Given the fall in prices, indicated in Empirical study result 1, it 
can be predicted that one-bedroom accommodation became more available for young 
professionals and an increased amount of people could afford their first accommodation. Thus, 
the demand for rented accommodation (for one-bedroom houses) went down, or showed no 
change. It can be expected to fall furthermore, as Empirical study result 4 shows that price for 
one-bedroom accommodation will continue to go down within the upcoming 12 months. 
 
For two-bedroom apartments, a significant amount (a majority of 40) of people predicted it 
would go down on -2.5%. This is coherent with economical intuition for the one-bedroom 
housing. The need for own property is higher for young families, who are deemed a primary 
target group for two-bedroom accommodation, that for the young professionals who can opt to 
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rent and allow a possibility to move more frequently. This rationale, however, contradicts 
findings from the question 2, where majority indicated no change in recent sales.  
For the three-bedroom houses, the demand is expected to be steady, with 39 professionals 
believing it will stay the same. 
 
For the 4 bedroom and larger houses, the demand is increasingly predicted to stay the same. 
This can be explained by the prices of such accommodation, that preclude current renters from 
buying their own property of the same size. Looking at it the other way, The question Empirical 
study result 6 also shows it is much easier to move from renting one-bedroom property to 
buying one, than shift from renting four-bedroom accommodation to becoming an owner of 
one. 
 
 
Empirical study result  6 - Page 3: Lettings market section. 
 
The following question Empirical study result 7 shown below continues to investigate housing 
market, but now from the perspective of 12 month to come. The results mirror those of The 
question Empirical study result 6, which proves that respondents were consistent in their 
predictions. Some 35.35% believe the rents will go up on +2.5%. It is important to note that I 
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did not indicate, should respondents take inflation into account or not. Some 28.28% of 
respondents believe the rents will stay the same, which means, given fluctuation in pound, it is 
expected to change insignificantly. 
 
The same is true for the two-bedroom property; 38% percent replied they expect an increase in 
rents on +2.5% and 34 questioned indicated they do not predict rents to go up. 
 
The highest number of people believing there would be no change in rents expect so with three-
bedroom and four-bedroom properties. Only 25% of interviewed people expect prices to go up 
on 2.5%. 
 
 
Empirical study result  7 - Page 3: Lettings market section. 
 
The question Empirical study result 8 (below) addresses current price level. It is evident that 
most people believe they are employed or working with projects where property is of fair value. 
The second biggest amount of respondents at 3% are convinced the property can be categorised 
as “expensive”. Only 4% of respondents replied the property is “Cheap”. Even lower amount 
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of people, 1% relied they believe the property is “Very Cheap”. It is important to note, while 
above mentioned is consistent with theoretical predictions, none on interviewed replied they 
are working with property which is “very expensive” This now shows that by narrowing down 
research to England, outliers were successfully eliminated. The most expensive property in the 
United Kingdom is considered to be in Scotland, St. Andrews. The average price of property 
there is £2,179,000 (Lloyds Banking Group Press Release of 23 December 2016). This can be 
compared to the average price of properties, observed in this thesis: £481,102 being average 
price for London (Gov.uk Press release, UK House Price Index for October 2016) 
 
 
Empirical study result  8 - Page 3: Page 4: Market Valuations. 
 
The last quantitative question Empirical study result 9 asks to forecast average annual growth 
rate for the next 12 months, April 2017 to April 2018. The leading amount of 58% expect the 
price growth will be negative (“somewhat”). In the conscious absence of a question “will not 
change”, and given natural inflation, it is a clear market of rent decrease.  
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Empirical study result  9 - Page 4: Market Valuations. 
 
Below is the infographic for the respondent’s regions, for which results are valid. A prevailing 
amount of professionals either operate or have projects in London. This can also be safely 
assumed the majority of replies are correlated to this region. 
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Empirical study result 10 - Page 5: Respondent's details. 
 
4.2 Discussion 
Overall, the respondents show rather unexpected negative market sentiment (Question 9), with 
the majority believing in market stagnation, i.e. prices will either not rise or fluctuate 
insignificantly (Question 1, Question 3, Question 4, Question 6 and Question 7). While this 
may be positive for the new buyers, it is also harmful for the people with outstanding mortgages, 
as the price of their property goes down.  
It is becoming easier to buy or afford down payment of the one-bedroom apartment and less so 
for the two-bedroom properties. There is expected no change for the three- or four-bedroom 
houses (Question 6, Question 7). 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The primary goal of this dissertation was to compound a comprehensive outlook that covers 
academic literature and recent publications from economic journals, and complement the study 
with empirical analysis on the topic of Impact of Brexit on the United Kingdom’s Housing 
Market. In April 2014, I was able to complete exchange course in Manchester. At the time, the 
important development in Manchester was the renovation of the public transportation system, 
which is built with financial support from the European Community. This is a single example 
of the added value of European Community membership of the UK. It helps modernize the city 
and the Great Manchester area, eg Salford, where we stayed, and improvs the quality of the 
built environment and consequently, the quality of life. The objective of this dissertation was 
to understand, how the Britain economy, seen through the real estate, will develop, having this 
support from the European Union excluded.  
 
I believe a lively, maintainable and robust property sector is a vital element in ensuring the long 
term prosperity of the United Kingdom as a country and as a leading economy. This affluence 
will grow through the post-Brexit maintained access to international labour, markets and 
capital. Though for most of the country, Brexit will have little effect on house prices. In much 
of the UK, homebuyers are moving because they need to, because of jobs or an expanding 
family; this means prices will hold up in much of those areas. 
 
The property market is slowing down, uncertainty stifles market sentiment, with no market 
expansion expected for twelve months to come, according to the survey. Inquiries from buyers 
are diminishing, as Brexit negotiations cause market uncertainty. The empirical evidence shows 
that property transactions are slowing down, too. 
 
The findings, data and analysis of the United Kingdom Residential Market Survey discussed in 
this dissertation could be used by the Government, the Bank of England and other key 
institutions, including the IMF, as an indicator of current and future conditions in UK residential 
sales and lettings. The analysis cover extensively market intelligence, and could be used both 
by investors and across the industry. 
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I.Appendix 
i. Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Note: Please respect the fact that respondent’s emails is restricted information and thus were 
squared out using Censure Mask function in the program Adobe Photoshop. 
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a. Informed Consent 
 
 Page 81 of 85 
 
b. Sales Market 
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c. Letting Market 
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d. Market Valuations 
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e. Respondent’s Details 
 
 
